包道格（Douglas H. Paal）
三种关系决定中国难以称霸 -- Will China Rule the World?
包道格（Douglas H. Paal）
《卡内基中国透视》
中国超过日本成为第二大经济体之后，“中国注定接替美国第一大经济体地位？”、“中国何时和如何超越美国成为第一大经济体？”以及“中美是否会因此发生冲突？”等问题的讨论和评论开始充斥各大国际媒体。
对此，卡内基国际和平基金会（Carnegie Endowment for International Peace）副总裁包道格（Douglas H. Paal）9月2日发表题为“中国能否统治世界（Will China Rule the World?） ”的文章称，对于中国能否称霸世界这一热点话题，我只要提出三点有关中国的关切，就可能使得那些害怕中国称霸的人获得些许安慰，即中国统治者与被统治者之间、中国统治者与国内竞争力量之间以及国有资本主义和市场资本主义之间的关系。
包道格称，这三大关系很少引起大众注意，而且媒体关注度不及中国人权问题、非民主措施和放纵的警察行政行为等热点。因为，考虑它们似乎有点不合常规，但是，对于一些不可预知的事情，可以进行不合常规地思考，因为，有的时候你会意识到，合乎常规地进行思考不但费脑，而且还有可能是失败和错误的。
统治者与被统治者之间的不和
在过去几年，外国许多政策专家见证了中共中央领导阶层和中国各种利益团体之间的进行的“激烈对话”，其中中共领导阶层掌管中国整体广泛利益。而且，得益于中国内部言论自由的不断进步和新传媒的不断壮大，中国退休军官、各界学者、政策专家和网民开始向中共党政官员发出质疑和挑战，要求中国在应对美国、日本、国际市场等方面采取更加严厉的立场。
作为回应，中国政府各发言人表态也是逾趋强硬，尤其在美国对台军售、奥巴马会见达赖、美军黄海演习以及美韩在中国南海的联合军演等形势下。发言人表态强硬他们往往是面临国内评论人士的压力，但这种压力很少来自政治体制方面。
不过，在中国实际外交关系事务中，中国官员表现并不是以“强硬措词”公开对抗美国及其他国家的利益。中国政府官员在外交场所中，往往展现得“明智谨慎”，国内公众场合面对评论家们则展现出一副“严肃面容”。
这种“强硬”而又“谨慎”的行政作风或许会逐渐失去重要性。随着中国官员在不同代表大会期间的更易，公众意见逐渐引导中国领导阶层的决策。这样的话，官员们在实现国家利益过程中只靠“谨慎”是不行，这样难以得到升迁，而是要表现得坚定和富有干劲，否则他们难以满足在中国快速现代化进程中民众对他们的期望。
中共内部政治精英之间“不和谐”
随着2012年中国共产党的临近，中国共产党内部“权力争夺”将逾趋激烈。据美国布鲁金斯学会中国研究中心资深研究员李成（Cheng Li）今年5月份发布在《中国领导箴言季刊》的文章称，预计在2012年秋季举行的中国共产党第十八次全国代表大会，中国将选举出新一届政治局及其常委会。届时，将有超过70%的中国共产党高层职位必须“换新”。这种规模的权力交接所带来的压力是其他任何政治体制无法承受的，且不说中国这一庞大13多亿人口当中，官员数量就超过6千万左右。
更令人担忧的是，在官员背景及政绩考核与升迁方面，中国尚未寻找到一套可信的领导人选举标准。中国这种问题有些国家也存在，但是，其“少数人统治十多亿人”的政治智慧是世界上独有的，尤其是其领导人在执政决策和表现方面缺少体制制衡。
而且，多种迹象和传言表明，中共中央总书记胡锦涛与国务院总理温家宝未来职位继承人早已“特定”。最近，据中国界内高层人士称，胡锦涛总书记和军委主席的接替人选还是一“未知数”，尽管外界推断中共政治局常委、中共中央党校校长、国家副主席习*近*平是这两个头衔的假定继承人。
同样也有传言称，中共内部几位副总理或“有意”争相夺取未来经济大权，从而能够成为未来国务院总理。现在充斥的讨论议题还有：需要寻找像前国务院总理朱镕基那样执政“果断、有力”的经济领袖，由此释放出对这几位副总理合格程度的些许怀疑。
中国国家资本主义和市场资本主义的冲突
“北京共识（Beijing consensus）”这一模式是另外一个备受讨论的主题。这一发展模式被称作是中国通过艰苦努力、主动创新和大胆实践，摸索出一个适合本国国情的发展模式。它表现的是独裁主义与国家资本主义的密切配合，在某种程度上被认为可以取代将民主主义和自由市场经济紧密相连的“华盛顿共识（the Washington consensus）”，而“华盛顿共识”受全球金融危机的影响已经收到质疑。
驳斥“北京共识”有多种方式和多种角度。卡内基国际和平基金会驻北京高级研究员佩蒂斯(Michael Pettis)称，中国经济快速增长模式依赖于将普通民众收入化作补助资金，分配给政府看好的投资者，其中包括国企和有后台的企业家。佩蒂斯认为，这种模式扭曲国际贸易模式，势将导致针对中国出口的保护主义政策，不利于中国贸易的最惠国待遇地位，中国GDP也将低于现在水平，从而引发中共就目前体制无法处理的社会动荡。
第二种看待“北京共识”模式的方式就是从日本二十世纪八九十年代亚洲“头号地位”看起。当时，资本的充裕和廉价，使得投资者不顾房地产及其他资产的过高估价大肆进行借入并流通，从而埋下日本经济衰退的祸根。日本出口并没有促成日本经济的崩溃，而是长时期的通货紧缩使得国内无法启动经济补救措施。就中国而言，随着其现代化发展步伐逐步向西扩展，经济还有继续增长的空间，但是，中国经济成就将主要依赖内需型经济模式拉动，而这种模式需要将投资收益返回给普通存款人用于消费，这将抬高资本成本，使得依赖低成本资金发展的企业难以盈利。也就是说，中国必须改变经商之道，并对其体制运行方式产生重大影响。
以上三种关系如果逐一予以应对或许“可控”，但同时应对三种关系将面临真正风险
如果在中国民众呼吁政府采取更为严厉的对外政策立场的同时，中国精英们开始进行“权力争夺”，照以往经验来看，中国国内民众关切将胜过对外政策利益。也即是说，中国民众对外国关切将不予理会。当绝对权力处以险境的时候，如中国和其他有些国家，对外关系细微之处则很快被抛之脑后。
或许最重要的是，中国经济成功管理方式最终将被调整以适应市场经济。为了赢得支持，头脑清醒的中国行政官员们将逐渐受到利益集团政治的影响，这种政治当然不基于市场经济学。期间，事实扭曲当然不可避免，使得中国民众无法得到真实的GDP数据，这类问题在统治者和被统治者之间存在不合时将被逐步恶化。
所以，在考虑中国能否成为世界霸主之时，应该侧重其“难驾驭”的一面以及其历史和经济发展中无法满足的各种“欲望”。中国将面临来自领国以及国际体制的各种新挑战，与此同时，中国经济还需要进行必要的“瘦身”以达到预期效果。所以，现在不是耗时讨论应对崛起中国与现状强权（美国）之间冲突的时候，而是，国际社会考虑如何合作限制中国崛起带来的挑战和伤害。
Will China Rule the World?
Douglas H. Paal
Carnegie Commentary, September 2, 2010
Once in a while it is worth pondering whether the conventional wisdom about China’s meteoric rise is right. Is China destined to move beyond its newly won position as the world’s number two economy to become number one? Will the United States be displaced from its primacy in global security? Is the rising power destined to clash with the current leading power? These are the themes of much recent commentary, including journalist Martin Jacques’ new book, When China Rules the World.
Thinking unconventionally necessarily involves speculating about things that are unknowable today. But doing so might prove a useful exercise before we reach conventional conclusions that are expensive, defeatist, or just plain wrong.
There are three big things going on in China that should be sources of concern—or perhaps relief—for those who fear China’s domination. These do not get much media attention and do not involve the usual reactions to human rights abuses, undemocratic methods, unrestrained police behavior and the like. Instead, it is about the relationships between rulers and the ruled; between the rulers and their internal competitors; and between state and market capitalism.
Discord Between the Rulers and the Ruled
Over the past year, foreign policy experts have witnessed what might be gently termed an intensifying conversation between Chinese interest groups and the central party leadership, which has overall responsibility for looking after China’s broader interests. Taking advantage of new media and increased freedom of expression within China, retired military officers, academics, policy experts and web users (called “netizens” in China), have questioned and challenged officers of the Chinese party and government to take tougher positions regarding the United States, Japan, international markets, and other matters.
In response, China’s spokesmen took increasingly tougher rhetorical positions under pressure from their critics inside China—but outside the formal political system. This happened on U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, President Barack Obama’s meeting with the Dalai Lama, proposed exercises by the aircraft carrier George Washington in the Yellow Sea, and surveillance missions in the South China Sea.
Yet, in the real conduct of foreign relations, China’s official actions have not yet gone beyond rhetoric to openly confronting the interests of the United States and others. Officials have displayed a prudent reserve in the quiet councils of government, while trying to show a tough public exterior to their critics inside China.
Is this sustainable? In the absence of a constructive narrative that will calm the patriotic appetites of the internal Chinese critics, it will probably prove futile. As party congresses come and go and public opinion increasingly guides leadership decisions, how long can Chinese officials who aspire for promotion gain approval for pursuing Chinese interests prudently, rather than robustly and aggressively? How long will they be willing and able to tone down popular rhetoric while delivering less than fulfilling compromises to a citizenry whose expectations have been fired up by China’s rapid modernization?
Discord Within China’s Ruling Communist Party Elite
Over the next two years, leading up to the Eighteenth Party Congress in late 2012, jockeying will intensify as more than 70 percent of China’s top jobs must be turned over to new leaders in accordance with recently introduced rules on retirement and tenure, according to Cheng Li of the Brookings Institution. This scale of turnover would strain any system, let alone one with such a huge denominator of population (1.3 billion) to the numerator of officials (around 60 million).
Adding to our worries is that China has not yet found a dependable set of criteria for selecting leaders in terms of background and performance before promotion. China is far from alone in this problem, but it is singular in its dependency on the wisdom of a few people to govern more than a billion, particularly leaders who lack institutional checks and balances on their judgments and performance.
There are, moreover, increasing signs and rumors that the designated successors to Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao may not be up to their jobs. On a recent visit, senior personalities said plainly to foreigners that the next leader after President and Party General Secretary Hu Jintao is unknown, despite Vice President Xi Jinping’s status as the presumptive heir.
Similar rumors surround the willingness or ability of several vice premiers to manage the Chinese economy as premier. A frequent conversation topic is the need to find a strong and decisive economic leader, like former premier Zhu Rongji, accompanied by expressions of doubt that the current candidates will measure up.
The Conflict Between State and Market Capitalism
Another current theme of commentary about China extols the “Beijing consensus” of authoritarianism married to state capitalism that has prospered when others faltered. It is seen as somehow replacing “the Washington consensus” that joins democracy with free market capitalism—now seen as discredited by the global financial crisis.
There are many ways to attack this point of view. One is articulated by my Carnegie colleague Michael Pettis, who says that China’s formula for rapid growth has depended on repressing the income of ordinary Chinese in order to dispense subsidized capital to favored investors, including state-owned enterprises and well-connected entrepreneurs.
Pettis argues that this distorts international trade patterns and will inevitably lead to protectionism against Chinese exports, and will, one way or another, bring China’s favored trade status today to an uncomfortable end. GDP growth will fall well below recent levels, introducing social tensions the Communist Party is ill-equipped to address in its present form. And these tensions may be even harder to address if the conflicts between rulers and ruled and between rulers and their competitors unfold as suggested above.
A second way of looking at the “Beijing consensus” is simply to remind ourselves of the hyped rhetoric of the 1980s and early 1990s, when Japan was seen as becoming “Number One.” Cheap and abundant capital, borrowed by investors against impossibly high valuations of real estate and other assets, set Japan up for a fall. In this case, it was not a collapse of Japan’s export markets that delivered the blow, but a prolonged deflation that resisted domestic remedy.
China may have room yet to continue growing as the benefits of modernization spread westward within China, but its success will depend on significantly promoting domestic-led growth, which in turn will require returning the proceeds of investment to ordinary depositors, which will raise the cost of capital to enterprises who now depend on low-cost capital to be profitable. In other words, the China we see now will have to change the way it does business—with major implications for how its system works.
Now, one of these problems by itself might be a manageable challenge for foreigners, their governments, and the international system, but the three taken together pose real risks. If China’s elite begins to fight over power as the public clamors for tougher foreign policy positions, experience suggests that domestic Chinese concerns will trump foreign policy interests. Foreign considerations would receive short shrift. When absolute power is at stake, certainly in China and elsewhere, the niceties of foreign relations are quickly forgotten.
Probably more important, China’s so-far successful management of its state economy will ultimately be forced to accommodate the gravity of market economics. In appealing for supporters, the level headed bureaucrats that have substituted for market forces in China’s economic rise in recent years will be increasingly subjected to interest group politics not necessarily grounded in market economics. Distortions will necessarily occur and deny the Chinese the rate of growth to which they are now accustomed. Again, these issues will be exacerbated by discord among the rulers and ruled.
So, instead of Chinese momentum toward world rule, we should be thinking about an unruly China, with unsatisfied historical and economic appetites. It will confront its neighbors and the international system with new challenges at the same time its economy will be reducing the means needed to shape outcomes. Therefore, it is time not to plan for a long-term wasting conflict between a rising power and the status quo power it seeks to replace. Rather, we should nurture international cooperation to limit the damage caused by a thrashing dragon.
包道格（Douglas H. Paal）
《卡内基中国透视》
中国超过日本成为第二大经济体之后，“中国注定接替美国第一大经济体地位？”、“中国何时和如何超越美国成为第一大经济体？”以及“中美是否会因此发生冲突？”等问题的讨论和评论开始充斥各大国际媒体。
对此，卡内基国际和平基金会（Carnegie Endowment for International Peace）副总裁包道格（Douglas H. Paal）9月2日发表题为“中国能否统治世界（Will China Rule the World?） ”的文章称，对于中国能否称霸世界这一热点话题，我只要提出三点有关中国的关切，就可能使得那些害怕中国称霸的人获得些许安慰，即中国统治者与被统治者之间、中国统治者与国内竞争力量之间以及国有资本主义和市场资本主义之间的关系。
包道格称，这三大关系很少引起大众注意，而且媒体关注度不及中国人权问题、非民主措施和放纵的警察行政行为等热点。因为，考虑它们似乎有点不合常规，但是，对于一些不可预知的事情，可以进行不合常规地思考，因为，有的时候你会意识到，合乎常规地进行思考不但费脑，而且还有可能是失败和错误的。
统治者与被统治者之间的不和
在过去几年，外国许多政策专家见证了中共中央领导阶层和中国各种利益团体之间的进行的“激烈对话”，其中中共领导阶层掌管中国整体广泛利益。而且，得益于中国内部言论自由的不断进步和新传媒的不断壮大，中国退休军官、各界学者、政策专家和网民开始向中共党政官员发出质疑和挑战，要求中国在应对美国、日本、国际市场等方面采取更加严厉的立场。
作为回应，中国政府各发言人表态也是逾趋强硬，尤其在美国对台军售、奥巴马会见达赖、美军黄海演习以及美韩在中国南海的联合军演等形势下。发言人表态强硬他们往往是面临国内评论人士的压力，但这种压力很少来自政治体制方面。
不过，在中国实际外交关系事务中，中国官员表现并不是以“强硬措词”公开对抗美国及其他国家的利益。中国政府官员在外交场所中，往往展现得“明智谨慎”，国内公众场合面对评论家们则展现出一副“严肃面容”。
这种“强硬”而又“谨慎”的行政作风或许会逐渐失去重要性。随着中国官员在不同代表大会期间的更易，公众意见逐渐引导中国领导阶层的决策。这样的话，官员们在实现国家利益过程中只靠“谨慎”是不行，这样难以得到升迁，而是要表现得坚定和富有干劲，否则他们难以满足在中国快速现代化进程中民众对他们的期望。
中共内部政治精英之间“不和谐”
随着2012年中国共产党的临近，中国共产党内部“权力争夺”将逾趋激烈。据美国布鲁金斯学会中国研究中心资深研究员李成（Cheng Li）今年5月份发布在《中国领导箴言季刊》的文章称，预计在2012年秋季举行的中国共产党第十八次全国代表大会，中国将选举出新一届政治局及其常委会。届时，将有超过70%的中国共产党高层职位必须“换新”。这种规模的权力交接所带来的压力是其他任何政治体制无法承受的，且不说中国这一庞大13多亿人口当中，官员数量就超过6千万左右。
更令人担忧的是，在官员背景及政绩考核与升迁方面，中国尚未寻找到一套可信的领导人选举标准。中国这种问题有些国家也存在，但是，其“少数人统治十多亿人”的政治智慧是世界上独有的，尤其是其领导人在执政决策和表现方面缺少体制制衡。
而且，多种迹象和传言表明，中共中央总书记胡锦涛与国务院总理温家宝未来职位继承人早已“特定”。最近，据中国界内高层人士称，胡锦涛总书记和军委主席的接替人选还是一“未知数”，尽管外界推断中共政治局常委、中共中央党校校长、国家副主席习*近*平是这两个头衔的假定继承人。
同样也有传言称，中共内部几位副总理或“有意”争相夺取未来经济大权，从而能够成为未来国务院总理。现在充斥的讨论议题还有：需要寻找像前国务院总理朱镕基那样执政“果断、有力”的经济领袖，由此释放出对这几位副总理合格程度的些许怀疑。
中国国家资本主义和市场资本主义的冲突
“北京共识（Beijing consensus）”这一模式是另外一个备受讨论的主题。这一发展模式被称作是中国通过艰苦努力、主动创新和大胆实践，摸索出一个适合本国国情的发展模式。它表现的是独裁主义与国家资本主义的密切配合，在某种程度上被认为可以取代将民主主义和自由市场经济紧密相连的“华盛顿共识（the Washington consensus）”，而“华盛顿共识”受全球金融危机的影响已经收到质疑。
驳斥“北京共识”有多种方式和多种角度。卡内基国际和平基金会驻北京高级研究员佩蒂斯(Michael Pettis)称，中国经济快速增长模式依赖于将普通民众收入化作补助资金，分配给政府看好的投资者，其中包括国企和有后台的企业家。佩蒂斯认为，这种模式扭曲国际贸易模式，势将导致针对中国出口的保护主义政策，不利于中国贸易的最惠国待遇地位，中国GDP也将低于现在水平，从而引发中共就目前体制无法处理的社会动荡。
第二种看待“北京共识”模式的方式就是从日本二十世纪八九十年代亚洲“头号地位”看起。当时，资本的充裕和廉价，使得投资者不顾房地产及其他资产的过高估价大肆进行借入并流通，从而埋下日本经济衰退的祸根。日本出口并没有促成日本经济的崩溃，而是长时期的通货紧缩使得国内无法启动经济补救措施。就中国而言，随着其现代化发展步伐逐步向西扩展，经济还有继续增长的空间，但是，中国经济成就将主要依赖内需型经济模式拉动，而这种模式需要将投资收益返回给普通存款人用于消费，这将抬高资本成本，使得依赖低成本资金发展的企业难以盈利。也就是说，中国必须改变经商之道，并对其体制运行方式产生重大影响。
以上三种关系如果逐一予以应对或许“可控”，但同时应对三种关系将面临真正风险
如果在中国民众呼吁政府采取更为严厉的对外政策立场的同时，中国精英们开始进行“权力争夺”，照以往经验来看，中国国内民众关切将胜过对外政策利益。也即是说，中国民众对外国关切将不予理会。当绝对权力处以险境的时候，如中国和其他有些国家，对外关系细微之处则很快被抛之脑后。
或许最重要的是，中国经济成功管理方式最终将被调整以适应市场经济。为了赢得支持，头脑清醒的中国行政官员们将逐渐受到利益集团政治的影响，这种政治当然不基于市场经济学。期间，事实扭曲当然不可避免，使得中国民众无法得到真实的GDP数据，这类问题在统治者和被统治者之间存在不合时将被逐步恶化。
所以，在考虑中国能否成为世界霸主之时，应该侧重其“难驾驭”的一面以及其历史和经济发展中无法满足的各种“欲望”。中国将面临来自领国以及国际体制的各种新挑战，与此同时，中国经济还需要进行必要的“瘦身”以达到预期效果。所以，现在不是耗时讨论应对崛起中国与现状强权（美国）之间冲突的时候，而是，国际社会考虑如何合作限制中国崛起带来的挑战和伤害。
Will China Rule the World?
Douglas H. Paal
Carnegie Commentary, September 2, 2010
Once in a while it is worth pondering whether the conventional wisdom about China’s meteoric rise is right. Is China destined to move beyond its newly won position as the world’s number two economy to become number one? Will the United States be displaced from its primacy in global security? Is the rising power destined to clash with the current leading power? These are the themes of much recent commentary, including journalist Martin Jacques’ new book, When China Rules the World.
Thinking unconventionally necessarily involves speculating about things that are unknowable today. But doing so might prove a useful exercise before we reach conventional conclusions that are expensive, defeatist, or just plain wrong.
There are three big things going on in China that should be sources of concern—or perhaps relief—for those who fear China’s domination. These do not get much media attention and do not involve the usual reactions to human rights abuses, undemocratic methods, unrestrained police behavior and the like. Instead, it is about the relationships between rulers and the ruled; between the rulers and their internal competitors; and between state and market capitalism.
Discord Between the Rulers and the Ruled
Over the past year, foreign policy experts have witnessed what might be gently termed an intensifying conversation between Chinese interest groups and the central party leadership, which has overall responsibility for looking after China’s broader interests. Taking advantage of new media and increased freedom of expression within China, retired military officers, academics, policy experts and web users (called “netizens” in China), have questioned and challenged officers of the Chinese party and government to take tougher positions regarding the United States, Japan, international markets, and other matters.
In response, China’s spokesmen took increasingly tougher rhetorical positions under pressure from their critics inside China—but outside the formal political system. This happened on U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, President Barack Obama’s meeting with the Dalai Lama, proposed exercises by the aircraft carrier George Washington in the Yellow Sea, and surveillance missions in the South China Sea.
Yet, in the real conduct of foreign relations, China’s official actions have not yet gone beyond rhetoric to openly confronting the interests of the United States and others. Officials have displayed a prudent reserve in the quiet councils of government, while trying to show a tough public exterior to their critics inside China.
Is this sustainable? In the absence of a constructive narrative that will calm the patriotic appetites of the internal Chinese critics, it will probably prove futile. As party congresses come and go and public opinion increasingly guides leadership decisions, how long can Chinese officials who aspire for promotion gain approval for pursuing Chinese interests prudently, rather than robustly and aggressively? How long will they be willing and able to tone down popular rhetoric while delivering less than fulfilling compromises to a citizenry whose expectations have been fired up by China’s rapid modernization?
Discord Within China’s Ruling Communist Party Elite
Over the next two years, leading up to the Eighteenth Party Congress in late 2012, jockeying will intensify as more than 70 percent of China’s top jobs must be turned over to new leaders in accordance with recently introduced rules on retirement and tenure, according to Cheng Li of the Brookings Institution. This scale of turnover would strain any system, let alone one with such a huge denominator of population (1.3 billion) to the numerator of officials (around 60 million).
Adding to our worries is that China has not yet found a dependable set of criteria for selecting leaders in terms of background and performance before promotion. China is far from alone in this problem, but it is singular in its dependency on the wisdom of a few people to govern more than a billion, particularly leaders who lack institutional checks and balances on their judgments and performance.
There are, moreover, increasing signs and rumors that the designated successors to Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao may not be up to their jobs. On a recent visit, senior personalities said plainly to foreigners that the next leader after President and Party General Secretary Hu Jintao is unknown, despite Vice President Xi Jinping’s status as the presumptive heir.
Similar rumors surround the willingness or ability of several vice premiers to manage the Chinese economy as premier. A frequent conversation topic is the need to find a strong and decisive economic leader, like former premier Zhu Rongji, accompanied by expressions of doubt that the current candidates will measure up.
The Conflict Between State and Market Capitalism
Another current theme of commentary about China extols the “Beijing consensus” of authoritarianism married to state capitalism that has prospered when others faltered. It is seen as somehow replacing “the Washington consensus” that joins democracy with free market capitalism—now seen as discredited by the global financial crisis.
There are many ways to attack this point of view. One is articulated by my Carnegie colleague Michael Pettis, who says that China’s formula for rapid growth has depended on repressing the income of ordinary Chinese in order to dispense subsidized capital to favored investors, including state-owned enterprises and well-connected entrepreneurs.
Pettis argues that this distorts international trade patterns and will inevitably lead to protectionism against Chinese exports, and will, one way or another, bring China’s favored trade status today to an uncomfortable end. GDP growth will fall well below recent levels, introducing social tensions the Communist Party is ill-equipped to address in its present form. And these tensions may be even harder to address if the conflicts between rulers and ruled and between rulers and their competitors unfold as suggested above.
A second way of looking at the “Beijing consensus” is simply to remind ourselves of the hyped rhetoric of the 1980s and early 1990s, when Japan was seen as becoming “Number One.” Cheap and abundant capital, borrowed by investors against impossibly high valuations of real estate and other assets, set Japan up for a fall. In this case, it was not a collapse of Japan’s export markets that delivered the blow, but a prolonged deflation that resisted domestic remedy.
China may have room yet to continue growing as the benefits of modernization spread westward within China, but its success will depend on significantly promoting domestic-led growth, which in turn will require returning the proceeds of investment to ordinary depositors, which will raise the cost of capital to enterprises who now depend on low-cost capital to be profitable. In other words, the China we see now will have to change the way it does business—with major implications for how its system works.
Now, one of these problems by itself might be a manageable challenge for foreigners, their governments, and the international system, but the three taken together pose real risks. If China’s elite begins to fight over power as the public clamors for tougher foreign policy positions, experience suggests that domestic Chinese concerns will trump foreign policy interests. Foreign considerations would receive short shrift. When absolute power is at stake, certainly in China and elsewhere, the niceties of foreign relations are quickly forgotten.
Probably more important, China’s so-far successful management of its state economy will ultimately be forced to accommodate the gravity of market economics. In appealing for supporters, the level headed bureaucrats that have substituted for market forces in China’s economic rise in recent years will be increasingly subjected to interest group politics not necessarily grounded in market economics. Distortions will necessarily occur and deny the Chinese the rate of growth to which they are now accustomed. Again, these issues will be exacerbated by discord among the rulers and ruled.
So, instead of Chinese momentum toward world rule, we should be thinking about an unruly China, with unsatisfied historical and economic appetites. It will confront its neighbors and the international system with new challenges at the same time its economy will be reducing the means needed to shape outcomes. Therefore, it is time not to plan for a long-term wasting conflict between a rising power and the status quo power it seeks to replace. Rather, we should nurture international cooperation to limit the damage caused by a thrashing dragon.
